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ABSTRACT 
 
MEGAN ELISE LEAHY: Corruption in Healthcare: Analyzing the Impact of 
Governance on Medical Corruption in the United States and Germany 
(Under the direction of John D. Stephens) 
 
 
This thesis contributes to the literature on corruption in healthcare systems by 
comparing the effectiveness of governance in two wealthy, stable democracies: the 
United States and Germany. Supported by evidence from an assessment of four 
dimensions of governance in healthcare systems, including accountability, transparency, 
monitoring and regulation and trust, it is argued that systems with less regulatory control 
and intervention from the state are more susceptible to higher rates of corruption. 
Implications from this research and evaluation may aid public officials around the world 
in designing more effective modes of healthcare governance, and eventually improving 
the overall access to and quality of healthcare provision.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 
This thesis would not have been possible without the support and direction from 
some key individuals and organizations. I would first like to thank my advisors, Dr. John 
D. Stephens and Dr. Ellen M. Immergut, for their insights and guidance through this 
process, as well as their flexibility and patience with my work. I am also very grateful to 
the advisors of the Transatlantic Masters Program in both Chapel Hill and Berlin, for 
their support and organization throughout the two-year program.  
To my family and friends in Chicago and Berlin, I would like to thank you for 
your endless encouragement and moral support during this program. Lastly, and most 
importantly, I owe an especially immense amount of gratitude to my mother, Mary 
Newman, who has not only supported and encouraged me throughout my entire 
education, but who has also given countless hours of editorial support for this thesis and 
all of my academic work. 
  iv 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter 
I. INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………….1 
II. CORRUPTION AND GOVERNANCE IN HEALTH SYSTEMS…………..3 
What is Corruption?.....……………………………………………………3 
Five Actors and their Opportunities for Corruption…………………………..4 
 Regulators…………………………………………………………………4 
 Payers…...…………………………………………………………………5 
 Providers…..…………………………….…………………………………6 
 Consumers…………………………………………………………………8 
 Suppliers..………………………………………………………………..10 
Vulnerabilities of Healthcare Systems to Corruption………………………..11 
Uncertainty..…………….………………………………………………..11 
Asymmetric information..………………………………………………..13 
Large Number of Actors..………………………………………………..14 
Moral Hazard...…………………………………………………………..15 
Adverse Selection………………………………………………………..15 
Governance in Healthcare Systems…………………………………….........16 
Accountability..…………………………………………………………..18 
Transparency…………………………………………………………..…10 
Monitoring and Regulation..…………………………………………..…20 
  v 
 
Trust…….……………………………………………………………..…22 
III. HEALTHCARE GOVERNANCE IN THE US AND GERMANY………...24 
Historical Development of Healthcare in the US and Germany…………..…25 
 United States……………………………………………………………..25 
 Germany…...……………………………………………………………..27 
Comparative Evaluation of Governance in US and German Healthcare…….28 
Accountability……………………………………………………………29 
 Transparency..……………………………………………………………31 
 Monitoring and Regulation…………………………………………..…..31 
Trust…….……………………………………………………………..…33 
IV. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION……….……………………………….35 
REFERENCES……………………………………………………………………..……38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
 Corruption has a negative impact on the delivery of healthcare services around the 
world. It comes in many forms and occurs at every level of the system. Researchers, 
policymakers and healthcare workers worldwide are increasingly focused on exposing its 
damaging consequences and examining different possibilities for reform and regulation. 
However, there is currently no consensus as to how the problem can be reduced or 
eliminated. The complex nature of the healthcare system makes this task exceedingly 
difficult to overcome, yet performing studies on the sources and impact of corruption 
may aid nations in reforming or designing their healthcare systems to reduce wasteful 
spending and maximize quality and efficiency of care.  
 This thesis intends to contribute to the existing literature on corruption in 
healthcare systems by concentrating on an area that has received insufficient attention 
until recent years – the impact of governance in healthcare institutions. Although there 
has been a recent surge in attention to the effects of governance on control of corruption, 
the focus has been overwhelmingly directed toward healthcare systems in developing 
nations. Thus, this thesis attempts to add to the scarce empirical literature by comparing 
governance in healthcare institutions of two wealthy democratic nations with long 
histories of social programs: the United States of America (US) and the Federal Republic 
of Germany (Germany). 
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Following a brief definition of corruption, the body of this thesis will be divided into two 
main sections: first, a general analysis of features of healthcare systems that
relate governance to systemic openness to corruption; and second, a comparative 
evaluation of effective governance in the US and German healthcare systems.  
Four dimensions will be examined in relation to governance in healthcare 
systems. These dimensions include accountability, transparency, monitoring and 
regulation and trust. Through a comparative evaluation of systematic vulnerabilities to 
corruption due to governance, with the presence of five groups of actors in the system, 
this thesis will argue that systems based on less state intervention experience higher 
exposure to possibilities of corruption. Due to the difficulty in measuring corruption and 
finding reliable data, this thesis does not extend itself to reveal actual variations in 
corruption for these two systems, but rather focuses on vulnerabilities to corruption due 
to ineffective healthcare governance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Chapter Two 
Corruption and Governance in Healthcare Systems 
 
 As a result of inherent challenges in measuring and predicting corruption, the 
quality and quantity of available research has been inadequate as of yet. The current 
theories are not sufficient for designing concrete generalizations or hypotheses on the 
issue of corruption in health systems. Thus, this section of the thesis attempts to elucidate 
existing theoretical models by discussing different features of the system as they relate to 
corruption.  
This thesis claims that both a high level of governance capacities, such as 
accountability, transparency and regulation, as well as positive social perceptions 
involving citizen trust, are necessary to reduce the impact of vulnerabilities of the 
healthcare system to corruption. To support this argument, this section will be divided 
into three parts: first, a description of the actors involved in the system; second, a 
breakdown of the features of healthcare that make the system prone to corruption; and 
finally, an analysis of four dimensions of governance that impact the level of corruption 
in healthcare.   
What is corruption? 
Before carrying out this analysis, it is necessary to have a clear definition of 
corruption as it relates to the healthcare system. Throughout the literature on the topic, 
there seems to be general agreement on the definition of corruption as “the misuse or 
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abuse of office for personal gain (Brinkerhoff, 2004; Lewis, 2006; Transparency 
International 2006; Vian, 2008). The office is a position of trust, where one receives 
authority in order to act on behalf of an institution, be it private, public or nonprofit. 
 
Five Actors and their Opportunities for Corruption 
The functioning of the public system is determined by the incentives facing the 
actors in the system, the manner in which inputs are managed and the 
accountability imbedded in the incentive structure. (Lewis, 2006, p.5) 
 
One of the common arguments as to why the healthcare system is frequently 
abused is that the complex design and high number of actors create several points where 
corruption could occur and reduce transparency in communication between actors. 
Recommendations for addressing this complexity often suggest establishing clear 
responsibilities and competencies for each actor, in order to better detect misuse and 
design appropriate responses for regulation. This section outlines the five groups of 
actors in healthcare systems and describes their roles and opportunities to abuse their 
authority or position for personal gain.   
Regulators 
Regulators include not only governmental institutions and organizations such as 
health ministries and parliaments, but also commissions, non-governmental and third-
party organizations created or appointed to carry out duties of regulation and control. 
Examples of regulators in Germany and the United States include health ministries 
(Bundesministerium für Gesundheit or U.S. Department of Health and Human Services), 
regulatory agencies (U.S. Food and Drug Administration), state-level agencies 
(Bundesrat or state health departments), police and several international and domestic 
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non-governmental organizations with specific regulatory interests (World Health 
Organization, citizens’ rights organizations, etc.). As the number of existing regulatory 
organizations is constantly growing, competencies are often overlapping or blurred.  
Actors in this category have a range of responsibilities, including designing 
policies for allocation of public funds, regulating approved drugs and procedures and 
assuring that healthcare facilities and workers are licensed, appropriately staffed and 
effective. Regulators are responsible for ensuring that the citizens have access to 
sufficient care and prescriptions; however, these duties also involve many opportunities 
and pressures for regulators to abuse authority or power. Furthermore, the number of 
actors involved creates an environment with minimal transparency and accountability. 
Thus, corrupt regulators are prone to fraudulent activities involving accepting bribes for 
approving medical practitioner licenses or new pharmaceutics, overlooking illegal or 
illegitimate practices and drawing up false reports on providers or facilities (Vian, 2008).  
Suggestions for how to reduce corruption within this group include increasing 
transparency through making regulatory assessments available as well as conversations 
between regulatory agents and their clients, increasing accountability externally by 
opening up citizen participation in health regulation and increasing accountability 
internally by dividing roles and competencies more clearly for better detection of 
corruption. 
Payers 
In health insurance systems, many possibilities exist for allocation of payments. 
Public insurance agencies include federally funded programs, such as Medicare/Medicaid 
and Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) in the United States, and the public 
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‘sickness funds’ (Krankenkassen) in Germany. Non-profit organizations that receive 
public funding exist to fill gaps in care for those who cannot afford it. Examples of such 
organizations include Red Cross, Save the Children and Planned Parenthood.  These 
organizations also frequently rely on fundraising projects in order to provide services for 
the uninsured. Other actors in the payers category include private insurance companies, 
which do generate revenue, but offer competitive insurance plans to citizens who can 
afford them both in Germany and the United States. Private insurers have much more 
autonomy in deciding whom they will insure based on health history and income.  
Additional and often informal payer organizations and structures have developed 
to provide patients without health insurance with access to affordable healthcare. These 
can come in the form of individual patient-provider agreements, or ‘concierge’ medicine, 
where individuals can pay a fixed price per year for either basic services or 
supplementary services to their insurance plans. These types of structures are especially 
vulnerable to corruption, as they are mostly undocumented and informal.  
 Both public and private payers are prone to corruption such as creating fraudulent 
claims, excessive billing, inappropriate allocation of public or private funds and 
embezzlement. Furthermore, the allocation of public funds for health insurance, when it 
is not universal, is a controversial issue ridden with opportunities for political interests 
and bribes to impact how the funds are distributed. Increased governmental transparency 
and accountability are necessary, but very tough to carry out. 
Providers 
Healthcare providers, as the main decision makers of the health system, have the 
highest number of opportunities for corruption. This group includes actors such as 
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physicians, dentists, nurses, pharmacists and other hospital staff. Healthcare providers are 
in a position to tell their consumers and payers which services are necessary and have 
control over the availability of certain drugs and procedures. Consumers rely on 
providers to offer appropriate services to improve their health conditions and are 
sometimes put in a position where they must offer extra monetary or other bribes to 
providers for certain procedures, organ transplants or prescriptions. Physicians often 
make decisions that are not in the best interest of their patients, for their own personal 
gain. This may include requiring monetary or other bribes for certain procedures or 
prescriptions, ordering unnecessary procedures to increase financial revenue or not 
providing necessary or optimal care due to the lack of benefits for the provider (Vian, 
2008).  
There is evidence that the manner in which providers are remunerated has a 
fundamental impact on the way in which they carry out their responsibilities for patients 
(Lewis, 2006; Savedoff & Hussmann, 2006; Vian, 2008). According to the research, 
providers who are paid on a fee-for-service basis, meaning they bill their patients for each 
service that was rendered, have a financial incentive to increase the amount of medical 
services, regardless of their necessity. Alternatively, ‘capitated’ payment programs, 
where providers are paid a fixed amount, regardless of how many services are provided, 
create incentives for providers to offer fewer services and procedures. It is in their 
financial interest to perform the least amount of work, which sometimes results in 
situations where doctors do not provide necessary services to the patients. A third method 
of compensation is ‘salaried’ payments. Here, the providers are not motivated either way 
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in the amount of services performed, but are often less productive overall (Transparency 
International, 2006).  
Doctors, hospital staff and pharmacists also have access to expensive drugs and 
medical supplies, which they may steal for their own private gain. They can report 
services that were not rendered on their reports to the insurers, or create fake patients to 
receive more payments from payers. They are also susceptible to accepting bribes from 
pharmaceutical companies who would like providers to prescribe their expensive drugs to 
the patients. Finally, in systems with mixed public-private funding, public providers have 
been found to refer their patients to their private practices for extra services that can be 
charged at higher prices than in public institutions, or to receive kickbacks from referrals 
to other private physicians. This type of corruption was heavily documented in the 
publically funded US Medicare program (Gewande, 2009).  
Detection and regulation of corruption by providers is very difficult to control, but 
possibilities for improvement exist. Medical regulatory boards, licenses and codes of 
ethics for providers are required for doctors to practice. Hospital reports and inventories 
could be made public to increase transparency and accountability in the system. Patients 
can protect themselves against corruption by using available resources to inform 
themselves of treatments for their illnesses, reducing the ability of providers to suggest 
unnecessary treatments. This principle, however, has caused many problems in the health 
sector with the patient-provider relationship (Tuohy, 2003).  
Consumers 
Patients, or consumers, of the healthcare sector are certainly not immune to 
committing fraudulent acts. Patients are usually in a vulnerable position, being reliant on 
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the honesty and competency of providers and payers. This vulnerability often creates a 
pressure for patients who cannot afford healthcare, or who would like better or faster 
service. These patients may find it beneficial or necessary to bribe providers or suppliers 
to offer services that are either illegal or unethical. Frequently, it is difficult to 
differentiate between gifts and bribes; therefore, this form of corruption is challenging to 
detect or measure. Furthermore, Lewis (2006) notes that in some nations, the practice of 
bribing providers or suppliers has become acceptable or customary. This is not true for 
Germany or the United States; thus offering bribes to providers is viewed as a corrupt 
behavior.  
 Another form of corruption committed by consumers is the act of giving false 
information to payers or regulators. In nations where healthcare is not universally 
required, consumers may abuse the system by attempting to use their own insurance plan 
to cover family or friends without insurance. This is more common in the United States, 
where insurance cards and forms are not well managed, and detection and controls are 
weak (Transparency International, 2006). Consumers may also bribe physicians to 
approve their medical health statuses in order to obtain licenses for activities such as 
driving or flying airplanes. Conversely, consumers may also bribe doctors to report poor 
health, so as to obtain disability benefits. This practice is quite common in nations with 
high social benefits for disability.  
 Methods for reducing these forms of corruption include increasing visibility of 
patient health through electronic databases that gather medical history information (e.g. 
German electronic health card, electronische Gesundheitskarte), standardizing medical 
report documents to increase transparency and accountability of providers and ensuring 
  10 
 
that all citizens have access to health insurance to eliminate the need for fraudulent 
insurance plans.   
Suppliers 
In the healthcare system, suppliers control access to the drugs and medical 
supplies used by the providers for the consumers. The actors include pharmaceutical 
companies (both domestic and international), medical equipment suppliers and 
biotechnology companies. Pharmaceutical companies are widely known for their corrupt 
activities in controlling the access and costs of drugs. They also control the quality and 
availability of the products and supplies, creating an opportunity for charging full prices 
to providers for products that are not of top quality, repackaging outdated equipment or 
expired drugs or setting excessive prices (Lewis, 2006).  
Suppliers also bribe regulators to change policies so they favor the supply 
companies. This is frequently manifested through agencies like the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), a government agency that controls which drugs and supplies are 
approved for medical providers to use under insured policies. Another opportunity for 
fraudulent behavior by suppliers is withholding information about negative side effects or 
reactions to new drugs.  
Many controversies have arisen around pharmaceutical companies in the past few 
decades, increasing the attention to regulation of such actors. This style of corruption is 
especially challenging to detect and prove, due to the fact that most of the meetings 
between suppliers and providers or regulators are carried out privately, and information 
about the impact of new drugs is often not made public. However, efforts should be made 
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to increase the transparency of drug-testing and alternative methods of treatment, so 
patients are not forced to accept only one possible treatment when others exist. 
 
Vulnerabilities of Healthcare Systems to Corruption 
Although the amount of research and literature focused on corruption in 
developed healthcare systems is rather minimal, there does seem to be a consensus on 
three features common to all health systems, which make them more susceptible to abuse 
and corruption: uncertainty, asymmetric information, and a large number of actors 
(Lewis, 2006; Savedoff & Hussmann, 2006). Furthermore, Lewis (2006) suggests two 
additional features of health systems that also appear to be correlated to corruption: 
adverse selection and moral hazard. However, these last two characteristics are specific 
to nations with some degree of welfare.  
Together, these five features point not only to weaknesses in the system in regards 
to opportunities for corruption, but also to weaknesses in the ability to detect and control 
corruption. Detection and regulation are very important for policymakers in combatting 
corruption. Below is an in-depth outline of how each feature opens up the system to 
possible fraud and misuse.   
Uncertainty 
The level of uncertainty in the field of medicine makes preventing illnesses, 
providing treatment and paying for services inherently difficult tasks. According to a 
contribution to Transparency International’s 2006 Global Report on Corruption in 
Healthcare, it is “due to uncertainty, [that] medical care service markets and health 
insurance markets are both likely to be inefficient” (Savedoff & Hussmann, 2006, p. 5). 
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Illnesses can go undetected for long periods of time, creating more serious conditions that 
require costly treatments. Patients without extensive medical knowledge are uncertain 
about how to best care for themselves or how to best treat their conditions. Providers, 
despite the depth of their knowledge and experience in medicine, are also never certain 
about their patients’ health conditions, the effects of treatment and the possibilities of 
alternative treatments. 
This feature of healthcare makes it very vulnerable to corruption by actors who 
know how to manipulate the system and take advantage of patients or providers in 
uncomfortable positions. There are several examples of situations where patients or 
providers may be manipulated by corrupt behaviors. On one side, patients may feel 
forced to accept costly and/or ineffective treatments that might not be in their best 
interest; they may take unnecessary prescriptions or tests because their providers called 
for it; they may undergo medical treatment for illnesses that do not require treatment; or, 
they may forgo medical treatment or neglect illnesses that must be treated by licensed 
providers. 
On the other hand, providers can offer care and services to the best of their 
abilities and knowledge, but can never be certain about the outcome of treatment or the 
future health of their patients (Lewis, 2006). They may prescribe incorrect drugs or order 
unnecessary tests for tricky illnesses that are difficult to detect or treat; they make their 
treatment plans based on symptoms reported by patients, who sometimes withhold or 
give false information to obtain certain medications; or, they may feel pressured by 
patients to carry out unnecessary tests or services in order to avoid potential exacerbation 
of conditions. 
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Health insurance is meant to be a solution to the uncertainties of medicine and 
healthcare, but in systems where insurance is not universal, the uncertainty makes the 
health insurance system more complex. For those without insurance, the issue is not 
resolved, but for those with insurance, there is the motivation to accept more treatment as 
a response to the fear of uncertainty. This issue manifests itself as a so-called moral 
hazard, which will be discussed in detail further on in this thesis. Universally required 
health insurance programs can protect healthcare systems from the vulnerabilities to 
corruption, but also generally create additional system inefficiencies (Savedoff & 
Hussmann, 2006). 
Asymmetric information 
The level of uncertainty is usually disproportional between different actors in the 
health sector. When this asymmetry in information occurs, it can manifest itself in 
principal-agent problems, where the principal, holding the information, may not act in 
the best interest of the agent, who does not possess the information or ability to make 
decisions (Tuohy, 2003).   
 In healthcare systems, where asymmetric information is an inescapable issue, 
there are several possibilities for relationships between the different actors to take on 
principal-agent characteristics. This is most obvious in the patient-provider relationship. 
Providers have extensive knowledge of illnesses, treatments and health implications, 
which is acquired through a very specific style of education and training. They are in the 
unique position of telling their patients what services are necessary and beneficial. 
Without the same level of information and knowledge, the patients are in a vulnerable 
position, forced to trust that the providers will perform their duties in the best interest of 
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the patients (Tuohy, 2003). However, this is not always the case. Providers are often 
found performing extra or fewer services in order to reap personal benefits from the 
imbalance of information. Patients also do not hold the authority to write prescriptions or 
order laboratory tests, and are therefore dependent on the providers to use their authority 
to provide the best services for the patients (Vian, 2008).  
Another principal-agent relationship in healthcare systems where the information 
is asymmetric is between pharmaceutical companies and the providers and patients. 
Pharmaceutical companies hold very sensitive and restricted information about the 
positive and negative effects of their drugs. The companies who want to sell their 
products without any public awareness of alarming side effects or cheaper alternatives 
often conceal this information, which should be shared with providers and the public 
(Lewis, 2006). 
Large number of actors 
The healthcare sector involves a great number of actors with various roles and 
responsibilities. Often, these roles are not clearly defined, overlap or are informal, which 
creates a very difficult environment for regulation and control. Without very clearly 
defined and measurable responsibilities, it becomes challenging to hold actors 
accountable for misuse and corruption. Furthermore, the interactions between actors and 
groups of actors are tough to manage due to the fact that each actor has a number of 
different interactions with other actors, sharing different or restricted information. The 
frequent exchanges between different levels of actors can make analyzing information an 
ambiguous and tedious task. 
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Monitoring the allocation of funds becomes increasingly vulnerable to corruption 
when the money is required to pass through several levels or change hands multiple 
times. It is often difficult to discern whether missing funds are due to misappropriation, 
miscalculations or miscommunication.  
Adverse selection 
 In healthcare systems that do not require or provide insurance for the entire 
population, adverse selection can become a big issue. In this situation, private health 
insurers select their customers based on their pre-evaluated risk-assessments, leaving the 
unhealthiest or the poorest citizens without insurance, or with expensive alternatives. 
Therefore, those who have the highest need for insurance- those with chronic illnesses or 
insufficient financial means- are left in more vulnerable positions without health 
insurance. If they experience injuries or serious illnesses, they must pay for services out-
of-pocket, and can usually not afford this. Government-mandated insurance plans can be 
used to avoid this situation and protect the poor and ill citizens (Lewis, 2006).  
Moral hazard 
 The converse of adverse selection is the problem of overconsumption, referred to 
as moral hazard. For those citizens who can afford insurance or are covered under public 
insurance programs, there is a risk of excessive use of healthcare services. In cases where 
out-of-pocket fees are very low or non-existent, the system’s ability to control for 
overconsumption is reduced. Due to third party payment, patients are not bothered with 
high bill payments, and thus do not feel the financial demands of treatment (Lewis, 
2006). This leads to situations where the patients accept treatments regardless of 
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necessity, and doctors might order additional tests or treatments either due to overly 
cautious care, or due to the financial incentives of over-testing.  
 This issue can be controlled through increasing the education of patients about the 
dangers of over-testing, or by employing a “capitated” remuneration system to remove 
financial incentives for providers. Additionally, payers and regulators can increase 
transparency through using electronic databases that track trends in medical treatments 
and testing.  
 
Governance in Healthcare Systems 
 The impact of governance on effective and efficient performance in healthcare 
systems is a prominent topic among researchers around the world. Although the literature 
is overwhelmingly focused on developing nations, the role of governance in stable and 
developed nations is equally important and relevant. However, the availability of 
measurable data and cross-country comparisons in relation to corruption in developed 
healthcare systems is minimal, making generalizations difficult to produce. The 
ambiguous nature of corruption limits the ability of researchers to generate convincing 
theories about its connection to the quality and capacity of government; yet, some 
researchers have succeeded. This section of the thesis will consolidate some of the 
existing theories of the role of governance in the healthcare institutions and attempt to 
connect it to the prevalence of corruption in developed healthcare systems.  
The term governance is generally associated with concepts such as accountability, 
transparency, regulation and citizenship participation. It is widely accepted that systems 
with stable and effective institutions also have a high level of “good governance,” defined 
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by Kaufmann and Kraay (2003) as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a 
country is exercised. What good governance actually implies is still not clearly outlined, 
but commonly accepted characteristics include:  
Capacity of government to formulate and implement sound policies, manage 
resources and provide services efficiently; the process that allows citizens to 
select, hold accountable, monitor and replace government; and, the respect of 
government and citizens for the institutions that govern economic and social 
interaction. (Lewis, 2006, p. 6) 
 
 In the Worldwide Governance Indicator report from the World Bank, Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Mastruzzi (2011), examine a set of six dimensions of governance in each 
country. These six indicators include voice and accountability, political stability and 
absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control 
of corruption. While these indicators are all very important to the general measurement of 
governance, they do not all apply when measuring governance in the healthcare sector. 
For this reason, this thesis draws from these definitions, and those of other governance 
experts (Lewis, 2006; Tuohy, 2003; Wendt, Kohl & Thompson, 2006) to compile a new 
set of governance indicators in the healthcare sector that best apply to the measurement of 
governance in the German and US healthcare systems.  
 Two features of governance that are most commonly attributed to the level of 
corruption are accountability and transparency. The Quality of Governance theory, 
developed by Bo Rothstein and Sören Holmberg at the University of Gothenburg, 
connects corruption to the level of institutional governance capacity, and postulates that, 
in countries where the level of governance is low, incidences of corruption will be higher 
due to the lack of accountability and transparency (Rothstein & Holmberg, 2011). There 
is much evidence that these two features can impact the quality of governance at every 
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level of the healthcare system, and improvements in these areas are crucial to 
successfully functioning systems. Two additional features that are frequently associated 
with healthcare governance are monitoring and regulation and trust (Brinkerhoff, 2004; 
Lewis, 2006; Tuohy, 2003) 
Together, these four features can be measured through various approaches in 
order to determine the quality of governance in healthcare systems. With this 
information, governments and healthcare workers can reform their systems and habits so 
as to minimize the possibility for and impact of corruption. However, measuring these 
features of governance is not always an easy task. The indices are often unclear, and data 
collection methods are difficult to design for abstract measurements. Existing methods 
include perception indices, cross-country data analysis, standard health indicators (e.g. 
mortality and morbidity rates) and surveys of public and private actors. 
Below is a detailed outline of how each of these four features relates to 
governance in the healthcare sector, and how they impact susceptibility to corruption. 
Accountability 
 When discussing quality of governance, accountability is almost always the first 
feature that is mentioned. In democratic institutions, accountability refers to the 
government’s responsibility to demonstrate to the citizens that it carries out the goals and 
provides services that are aligned with the interests and needs of the public (Vian, 2008). 
In terms of healthcare institutions, accountability applies not only to the government, but 
also to the actors every level. Each actor has a duty to carry out a certain task, and the 
effectiveness of the system depends on the integrity of all actors to stick to their 
responsibility. In order to have an efficiently functioning system, different methods are 
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used to hold these actors accountable for their actions, but when these methods fail, 
corruption may occur.  
 In the healthcare system, accountability is important at every level. Applied to the 
system as a whole, a sufficient level of accountability requires that the citizens have a 
voice and ability to influence the system to reflect the needs and wants of the public. A 
healthy system will include features such as effective checks and balances; civil society 
boards; democratically elected or appointed officials; and accurately collected and 
reported data. Due to the size of the healthcare system, and the large number of actors, it 
is very important that the public and private sectors communicate well and share full data 
and information to avoid leaving gaps for corruption or overlapping duties and wasting 
public funds on unnecessary tasks.  
 At the micro-level, each actor in the system must be held accountable to their 
other actors and the citizens. In order to achieve this, frequent dialogue should occur, 
goals and expectations should be clearly defined and information must not be withheld. 
Additionally, the numerous financial exchanges and transactions, including the allocation 
of public funds, must be accurately reported to avoid vulnerabilities to misappropriation 
or embezzlement. Furthermore, Brinkerhoff (2004) suggests that the transactions and 
services must not only be accurately reported, but also justified. It must be clear to the 
public and to the individual that services were necessary, or that allocation of funds was 
applied in the most appropriate manner to maximize the benefits for the citizens.  
 With a higher level of accountability in the healthcare system, actors will feel 
pressured to carry out their duties in an ethical manner, and will not feel the opportunity 
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for corruption. A better design of accountability in the healthcare institutions will reduce 
corruption and lead to higher performance (Brinkerhoff, 2004).  
Transparency 
 Transparency is very closely related to accountability in terms of governance. In 
order to hold actors and officials accountable, it is crucial that their decisions, activities 
and performance data be available to the public. Without open access to this information, 
citizens and policymakers cannot be aware of the problems that need to be addressed. 
Healthcare system policies must include government-mandated disclosure of this 
information (Vian, 2008). There are many ways in which this can be transmitted to the 
public, including open access through websites, publishing data in regular reports, 
releases from the healthcare officials, publishing financial reports and holding regular 
local and national public meetings.  
 In many healthcare systems, patients are put on waiting lists for procedures, drugs 
or organ transplants that are scarce in availability. When the lists are not made publically 
available, they may be tampered with to favor patients who offer bribes for a higher spot 
on the list (Lewis, 2006). This form of corruption has been quite common even in 
developed nations, including in the US and Germany. Publishing these lists and making 
other reports about medical supplies and services public can significantly reduce the 
possibility for abuse by medical professionals.  
Monitoring and Regulation 
 Ensuring quality governance in public institutions requires regular monitoring and 
effective implementation of regulation policies. Both features are necessary and 
dependent on each other. On the one hand, the evidence of fraud or corruption collected 
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from monitoring the system must be accurate in order to justify the application of 
sanctions. Conversely, sanctions must be deemed appropriate and warranted for the 
dishonest actions or behaviors.  
Within the complex structures of the healthcare institutions, achieving both 
accurate monitoring and effective control of corruption is a challenge for policymakers 
and regulatory actors. Due to the large number of actors and the high level of uncertainty 
in healthcare, the ability to track all activities and transactions becomes an increasingly 
difficult chore. Furthermore, when accurate and full monitoring of the system is not 
accomplished, regulation policies and control of corruption cannot be effectively 
implemented.  
 Monitoring of the health system can be carried out through various procedures, 
including requiring licensing and accreditation of providers, regular recertification 
processes, publishing provider and payer “report cards” that display information about 
quality of services, establishing a system of quality standards through guidelines, 
benchmarking, patient reviews of the physicians or facilities, or linking payments to the 
quality and availability of services (Lewis, 2006; Brinkerhoff, 2004). All of these 
methods can increase the ability and accuracy of detecting corruption in order for 
regulators to respond with appropriate sanctions.  
 In terms of regulation capacity, the application of legal sanctions is essential in 
shaping incentives for corruption, but social sanctions also play a very important role in 
the informal regulation of behaviors. Social sanctions refers to normative practices, such 
as shaming, blacklisting or rewarding good behaviors, and can sometimes be more 
important in controlling corruption than legal regulation (Vian, 2008).  
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Effective monitoring and regulation capacities also impact the level of 
accountability in the healthcare sector. Through the successful application of legal and 
informal standards and procedures, actors feel more pressure to comply with the actions 
and behaviors that are expected of their role (Brinkerhoff, 2004).  
Trust 
“Corruption eats away at the public’s trust in the medical community. People 
have a right to expect that the drugs they depend on are real. They have a right to 
think that doctors place a patient’s interests above profits. And most of all, they 
have a right to believe that the health care industry is there to cure, not to kill,” 
David Nussbaum, Chief Executive of Transparency International (Transparency 
International, 2006) 
 
 Often times, the issue of trust is not addressed when discussing features of good 
governance. This thesis argues that trust is, however, one of the essential features of 
governance in relation to the occurrence of corruption. Systems that lack a sufficient level 
of trust are more prone to abuse by the actors involved. Perceptions also play a powerful 
role in shaping behavior. Investors and patients who perceive corruption or poor quality 
may be deterred from investing in or using the services (Lewis, 2006). 
On the macro-level, trust is generally discussed in terms of citizen confidence and 
dependence on the honesty, effectiveness and accountability of their public officials and 
institutions. In systems that involve a high level of public funding drawn heavily from 
taxes, trust is necessary to motivate citizens to pay taxes and not abuse the system. 
Evidence has shown that when the citizens trust their social institutions (i.e. welfare 
programs), the systems perform better and experience a significantly lower level of 
corruption and abuse. According to the OECD Social Indicators (2011), trust in social 
institutions is higher in wealthier countries where income is more evenly distributed. 
Both Germany and the US are considered wealthy nations, but income is much more 
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evenly distributed among the German citizens than it is among the American citizens. 
Thus, where larger gaps in social classes exist, citizen trust in social institutions is lower 
and corruption is more likely.  
 On the micro-level of healthcare systems, trust is critical in keeping good 
relations between the actors. If citizens feel that their payers and physicians are held 
accountable, there will be an increased level of trust not only in their treatments, but also 
in the system as a whole. When trust is low due to perceptions of high corruption, citizens 
may be less likely to visit their physicians when they fall ill, or to take preventative care. 
Furthermore, in systems where insurance is not mandatory, lack of trust in the insurance 
organizations may deter some people from purchasing insurance, leading to an increased 
social risk.  
Strategies to increase trust and improve perceptions of healthcare systems include 
improving open and regular dialogue at every level of the system; increasing 
transparency and improving measures for accountability. Tuohy (2003) suggests that 
accountability in the healthcare systems is no longer based on the standard “principal-
agent” trust-based structure, but has rather evolved into a system requiring formal 
accountability mechanisms that are designed to punish violators. Whether or not these 
formalized mechanisms have increased effectiveness of governance in healthcare will be 
discussed further on in this thesis.  
 
 
 
 
 Chapter Three 
Healthcare Governance in the US and Germany 
 
At this point, the general features related to governance and vulnerabilities of 
healthcare systems have already been examined. Thus, this section of the thesis shifts to 
an empirical perspective, comparing the dimensions of governance in two systems based 
on different principals of coverage, financing and regulation: a market-based system in 
the United States and a social health insurance (SHI) system in Germany. It first draws 
attention to the historical development and central features of each system in order to 
demonstrate where they differ. Next, it evaluates the capacities for governance in the US 
and German healthcare sector, dividing the analysis along the four dimensions of 
governance discussed in the previous section.  
According to the OECD Social Indicators (2011), both systems have generally 
high levels of governance capacity and experience a low rate of corruption relative to 
global standards. These statistics do not, however, imply that these systems are immune 
to abuse and fraudulent activities. For both of these nations, healthcare costs are deemed 
to be excessive, and much of the wasteful spending occurs due to corrupt or fraudulent 
activities. Examining governance capacities may highlight areas that are particularly 
vulnerable to corruption and allow these nations to design reforms that will improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of healthcare systems (Lewis, 2006; Rothestein & Holmberg; 
Vian, 2008).
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Historical Development of Healthcare in the US and Germany 
United States 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s decision in 1934 to remove public health from the 
New Deal agenda led the US to develop a private insurance system through employer 
benefits. This structure placed private insurance companies in a powerful position from 
the start, working only under the control of market mechanisms, with minimal 
interference from state-level regulatory agencies (Wendt et al., 2006). Only minor 
reforms were made to extend coverage to certain risk groups, such as the passing of 
Medicare and Medicaid in 1965. At that time, the healthcare system in the US had 
already been tightly bound to the original design of privatized insurance; thus, expanses 
in public coverage were very difficult to achieve (Hacker, 1998). Until the passing of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) in March 2010, no major reforms 
had passed through Congress. 
 Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, when the labor market experienced significant 
changes in both numbers and types of employees, employers altered their benefit plans. 
The existing health insurance system was not set up to protect the citizens who were no 
longer covered and/or could not afford private insurance. Large populations of Americans 
were left uninsured during a time when healthcare expenses were increasing at rapid rates 
(Haeder, 2012).  
As a result of the lack of universal coverage, a wide range of alternatives to public 
or formal private insurance have developed in the United States. Furthermore, the 
decentralization of authority in the US to the state-level has led to fragmentation within 
the health insurance policies (Haeder, 2012). Today, the payers include a very complex 
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mix of federal public insurance programs, private insurance, employer insurance 
programs, federally-funded non-profit organizations (e.g. Planned Parenthood), cash-
based payments from patients without health insurance and several other alternative 
programs for insuring citizens for healthcare (Haeder, 2012). For those US citizens 
without formal or alternative insurance plans, cash payments and non-profit clinics are 
the only option.  
As for the standard employer-sponsored health insurance plans, the traditional 
forms of remuneration were administered through Preferred Provider Organizations 
(PPOs) or Medical Savings Accounts (MSAs). However, in the early 2000s, Health 
Savings Accounts (HSAs) replaced MSAs. Conditions for coverage in these types of 
plans are decided between individual and employer negotiations with the insurance 
companies. Negotiations are carried out without interference from national regulations.  
Recently, there has been a trend in the US toward more state control. This can be 
observed through the introduction of Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) and 
Managed Care plans, both of which increase the regulatory capacities of the state (Wendt, 
Frisina & Rothgang, 2009). Additionally, with the passing of the PPACA in 2010, the 
role of the state has been strengthened through the forms of mandated coverage, federal 
subsidies and tax credits (Haeder, 2012).  
Critics of the Affordable Care Act point to its failure in performing a complete 
overhaul the US healthcare system. It was intended to create a universal and more 
coherent system, but as Tuohy (2011) notes:  
The final result was a complex and entirely Democratic partisan mosaic formally 
comprising the ACA with more than four hundred sections, a budget 
reconciliation act with thirty-eight sections relating to health care reform, and a 
four-section executive order. (p. 574) 
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Still, others, such as Haeder (2012), consider the PPACA to contain some successes for 
reform, considering the system’s history of extreme reluctance to introduce or amend 
even minor federal policies.  
Germany 
The framework for Germany’s current healthcare system dates back to 1883, 
when the nation introduced the first mandatory national social health insurance (SHI) 
system under the leadership of Otto von Bismarck. At this time, the system required only 
workers with lower incomes to partake in the social health plans, which were distributed 
through workers guilds and unions (Immergut, 2009; Porter & Guth, 2012). The system 
was designed to give administrative responsibilities to local structures, but retained a 
strong supervisory role for the central state structures (Altenstetter & Busse, 2010). This 
design has proven very stable, yet very difficult to reform to new social risks and cost 
containment strategies. Still, the German healthcare system was able to gradually extend 
its programs by the end of the 1980s to provide virtually universal coverage (Bump, 
2009).  
Following the successful reunification of West and East Germany and an 
impressive economic and political recovery, the German citizens have given significantly 
more trust to centralized state authority. This trust in the state institutions has allowed for 
Germany to make reforms in some areas of health insurance policy without much 
contention. However, the capabilities of governmental institutions are still quite limited 
by the decentralized structure, requiring several levels of approval before any reforms can 
pass into law (Porter & Guth, 2012).   
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Today, Germany has a mixed public-private health system. Since 1996, citizens 
have been given the freedom to choose from among the legally accepted statutory health 
plans, which are administered from the public “sickness funds” (Krankenkassen). These 
organizations, collectively referred to as the Verbände der gesetzlichen Krankenkassen 
(GKV), are independent from the government and are required only to work within a 
framework designed and decided by the state (Wendt et al., 2006). The premiums are 
fixed by the state according to income, and some state subsidies are offered for certain 
risk populations, such as low-income workers (Porter & Guth, 2012). 
Toward the end of the 20th century, a private insurance system began developing 
as an option for certain groups of the population. By this time, the state was focused more 
on cost containment strategies, which led it to introduce this private option for workers 
who earned above a certain salary. Self-employed workers, government employees and 
those who earn above 4,125€ per month (as of 2010) were offered the opportunity to opt 
out of the public sickness funds (Porter & Guth, 2012). These groups have the option to 
design personal insurance plans with private insurers. However, for various reasons, only 
a small percentage of the population chose to take private insurance. Statistics vary, but 
the percentage of the population insured under the private plans teeters around 10% 
today. Still, the number of citizens opting for private insurance plans is growing (Porter 
& Guth, 2012).  
 
Comparative Evaluation of Governance in US and German Healthcare  
In the OECD cross-country comparisons, the US healthcare system has been 
reported to have a higher rate of corruption than the German system (OECD, 2012). This 
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section intends to reveal the inconsistencies in US and German healthcare governance 
capacities, which relate to the variances in rates of corruption. The development and 
design of these two healthcare systems has been shown in several publications (Lewis, 
2006; Tuohy, 2003; Wendt et al., 2006; Wendt et al., 2009) to fundamentally impact their 
capacities for performance in four essential dimensions of governance: accountability, 
transparency, monitoring and regulation and trust. While these dimensions are very 
tightly intertwined and frequently overlap in terms of increasing their effectiveness, it is 
beneficial to analyze them separately in order to discover shortcomings in the governance 
capacities of their systems. 
Accountability 
All healthcare systems must develop a scheme for maintaining accountability. 
Different approaches have been used to ensure effective control, oversight, cooperation 
and accurate reporting of the activities that occur within healthcare systems around the 
world, yet there is no agreement as to which approach is most effective. Each group of 
actors in the US and German health systems are confronted with highly asymmetrical 
relationships in terms of expertise, information, access to services and personal 
incentives. Furthermore, due to the fact that providers control the relevant information, 
central supervisory bodies have weak capacities for monitoring performance of providers 
and facilities, reducing accountability (Brinkerhoff, 2004).  
In terms of controlling transfers of funds and billing reports, systems that use 
public agencies for funding services have been shown to more effectively regulate 
financial exchanges than those based on market control (Wendt et al., 2006). Thus, the 
German SHI system, which is mostly (approximately 90% in 2010) administered through 
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the public sickness funds, should have a higher capacity for maintaining accountability 
(Porter & Guth, 2012). However, with the rise of private health insurance in Germany, 
and the growing fragmentation of the system, opportunities for corruption are growing.  
In the US system, the market-driven approach has integrated methods for holding 
actors accountable. The natural influences from the market force actors to provide the 
best quality and value of service if they want to remain competitive (Wendt et al., 2009). 
Though, this is not always the case, especially when transparency is weak and providers 
and payers offer false information. In this case, regulatory agencies must protect the 
consumers by ensuring that the actors are providing correct information (Tuohy, 2003).  
On the other hand, this market-based approach has left gaps in coverage and led 
to the creation of numerous ad hoc health insurance programs. The system has become 
highly fragmented. In addition to public programs (e.g. Medicare and Medicaid) and 
standard private insurance plans (e.g. HMOs, PPOs, and managed care), providers might 
accept informal forms of payment through various private negotiations. Furthermore, the 
controls and regulations are designed by agencies at the state-level, further complicating 
the fragmented system (Tuohy et al., 2004).  
Though, both systems face challenges in terms of maintaining accountability, the 
US system must overcome much larger structural deficits. The rapidly growing number 
of actors, as well as the ad hoc creation of regulatory agencies, creates massive 
inefficiencies in oversight, monitoring performance and improving cooperation. Despite 
the intention to yield regulatory control to the market mechanisms, the US system has 
created an incredibly complex healthcare structure, making it intrinsically difficult to 
employ effective accountability mechanisms.  
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Transparency 
 Transparency is a crucial aspect in measuring the effectiveness of governance in 
healthcare systems. Measures for increasing transparency are typically conducted through 
issuing public reports on quality of performance and exchanges of services, supplies and 
finances. Both the US and German healthcare systems have strong policies aimed at 
increasing transparency, yet they face weaknesses in certain areas of the healthcare 
system, including procurement of pharmaceuticals, misallocation of supplies and 
transfers of informal payments.  
 In terms of drug procurement, both systems lack effective mechanisms for 
revealing corruption. Pharmaceutical companies are known to offer bribes for providers 
to prescribe their drugs and withhold information about negative effects (Leiws, 2006). 
As for the allocation of supplies, both the US and Germany have discovered long-term 
abuse of the organ transplant waiting lists. For years, hospitals and medical professionals 
had manipulated transplant waiting lists for private gains. This abuse of the system went 
undetected, due to the lack of sufficient measures for monitoring and providing reports on 
the activities within the system. Neither type of system has inherent abilities to overcome 
insufficient transparency; thus, they must address it within their mechanisms for 
monitoring and regulation.  
Monitoring and Regulation 
Governance in the healthcare sector relies on a competent design and 
implementation of mechanisms for monitoring and regulating activity within the system. 
Although the specific configuration of regulatory models can vary widely, each 
framework requires not only effective monitoring and oversight, but also the ability to 
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apply formalized sanctions for noncompliance. Although several articles have attempted 
to created typologies for healthcare regulatory systems, Wendt et al. (2006) focus on 
three types of regulatory structures: hierarchical (state-led), self-regulation through non-
governmental organizations (seen in SHI systems) and market regulation. 
With regard to the US and German healthcare systems, the basic structures of 
their systems have led to two fundamentally diverging modes of regulation. In the mostly 
private system in the US, the market has been the primary source for regulating activities, 
controlled only when necessary by state-level regulatory agencies. However, the medical 
care system cannot function purely on market influences. Over time, the increasing 
fragmentation of the system, as well as the gradual addition of public programs, have 
required national-level and third-party oversight agencies (Wendt et al., 2009). Wendt et 
al. (2006) mention that recently, there has been more convergence in the US system 
toward hierarchical regulation through the Managed Care and HMO plans.  
 In the SHI system of Germany, regulatory mechanisms are carried out through 
self-regulation by the sickness funds, which are non-governmental organizations. Still, 
the state plays a significant role in setting the framework within which the sickness funds 
and providers negotiate their schemes. The German system has introduced policies that 
intend to incorporate some level of market-driven influence. For example, since 1996 all 
members of public sickness funds have been given the freedom of choice between 
different funds. This policy encourages competition among the sickness funds in order to 
increase their quality of services for consumers (Porter & Guth, 2012). Though much of 
the daily regulatory control comes from the non-governmental sickness funds, the state’s 
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influence is decidedly higher in SHI than in market-driven healthcare systems (Wendt et 
al., 2009).  
Trust 
 Aside from the traditional formal dimensions of governance previously discussed, 
trust is an essential aspect of the healthcare system. Due to the inherent information gaps 
in healthcare, actors within the system are frequently left to make decisions based on trust 
that the other actors will perform tasks in the best interest of both parties. Tuohy (2003) 
stresses that, over time, systems have designed various solutions aimed at reducing the 
vulnerabilities caused by these asymmetric “principal-agent” relationships. Solutions 
have included establishing contractual relationships and, more recently, creating 
accountability mechanisms. While these structural solutions may increase accountability 
by applying formalized sanctions, trust still plays a very significant role in daily 
healthcare governance.  
 Logically, a well-performing healthcare system should foster trust in the 
relationships between different actors, which would lead to more efficient provision of 
services. The presence of insecurities among the actors may lead them to focus on 
maximizing personal benefits, rather than acting in the best interest for the general good 
and for the system. Thus, higher levels of trust should indicate a lower incidence of 
corruption. However, the OECD Social Indicators (2011) show that, while the perception 
of corruption in social institutions is higher in the US (67%) than in Germany (61%), the 
percentage of US citizens (58%) who trust their social institution is higher than in 
Germany (53%). These numbers are inconsistent with what would be expected in these 
two types of healthcare systems.  
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 The German SHI system functions mostly by self-regulation, which features more 
integrated mechanisms for accountability. On the other hand, the market-based system in 
the US relies on natural mechanisms of the market, such as competition, to regulate the 
healthcare system. Yet, this type of system can lead to high fragmentation and low 
capacity for accountability, which eventually results in the need for additional ad hoc 
state regulatory agencies and mechanisms (Wendt et al, 2006). One would expect that the 
clearly defined roles of the German system would lead to greater trust in the public than 
in the exceedingly complex structure of the US market-driven system. Nevertheless, the 
OECD statistics indicate otherwise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Chapter Four 
Conclusion and Discussion 
 
 Through this cross-country comparison of four dimensions of governance in the 
US and German healthcare systems, it has been shown that the model of healthcare does 
impact the governance capacities. As previously discussed, these discrepancies in 
governance can lead to variances in susceptibility to corruption. Numerous publications 
have indicated that low levels of governance are strongly correlated to higher incidences 
of corruption (Lewis, 2006; Vian, 2008; Rothstein & Holmberg, 2011). This thesis does 
not analyze the data on corruption, but rather suggests that more effective governance can 
better control the areas of healthcare that are most vulnerable to corruption.  
 In regards to the US and German systems, this analysis has shown that SHI 
systems have higher capacities for monitoring and regulating healthcare, which support 
stronger mechanisms for accountability and transparency. In terms of the level of trust in 
the system, it has been shown that higher capacities for regulation do not necessarily 
indicate more trust from the citizens. The OECD Social Indicators (2011) report 
demonstrates that citizens in the US, who live under a highly complex and fragmented 
system, have more trust for their social institutions. Overall, these four dimensions of 
governance can be deemed more effective in healthcare models that rely on more 
intervention from the state, and less on the natural mechanisms of the market.  
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The overarching goal of evaluating systems and policies according is to improve 
performance and effectiveness by highlighting not only the weaknesses that need reform, 
but also the strengths that can be used as exemplary models. The fact that health systems 
in advanced welfare nations such as the US and Germany are converging on certain 
policy areas implies that lessons have been learned from comparing systems. Thus, 
despite its inherent weaknesses and assumptions, this thesis can contribute something to 
the steadily growing collection of literature on corruption in healthcare. 
Existing research on the topic of corruption in healthcare systems has attempted to 
link the occurrence of corruption to variances in governance capabilities; however, 
empirical research on this claim is mostly performed in reference to developing nations. 
It is the recommendation of this thesis that researchers in this field extend their focus to 
include nations with advanced healthcare systems that have developed over a longer 
period of history. These systems face common challenges in overcoming excessive 
healthcare spending. Establishing better governance for regulating these systems could 
lower rates of corruption and significantly reduce wasteful spending.  
The interest for this thesis stems from reading Atul Gewande’s June 2009 article 
in the New Yorker Magazine entitled “The Cost Conundrum: What a Texas town can 
teach us about healthcare.” In this article, Gewande discusses the causes for such a large 
discrepancy in Medicare usage in two different counties of the United States. In Hidalgo 
County, Texas, the average Medicare spending per capita, at $12,000, was the highest in 
the US. The neighboring county, El Paso, spent nearly half as much as McAllen, $7,504 per 
Medicare enrollee (Gewande, 2009).  
When reports on the quality of health services in these two counties did not 
connect higher costs to better quality, investigations into the discrepancies were carried 
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out. The results of the investigation show that medical professionals in Hidalgo County 
were abusing their roles in both the patient-provider and the payer-provider relationships 
in order to maximize personal benefits. Corrupt activities, such as over-testing, providing 
false claims to insurers, accepting bribes and kickbacks and referring patients to their 
parallel private practices, were frequently exercised in Hidalgo County (Gewande, 2009). 
Questions as to the sources for the variation in corruption in these two counties led to the 
development of this thesis.  
The main challenge of healthcare systems is to make effective use of available 
resources while meeting the medical and social needs of the citizens. Regular analyses of 
healthcare governance and policies aid decision makers in designing more efficient 
systems for administering health services. 
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